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FOURTH DEPARTMENT
People v. Saurini 2981
(decided February 4, 1994)
Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress
evidence on the grounds that the warrantless entry onto his
property by deputy sheriffs violated his constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures pursuant to both the
New York State Constitution 2982 and the United States
Constitution. 2983 The People argued that the entry and seizure
was either justified under the plain view doctrine, 2 984 or the open
fields doctrine. 2985 The Appellate Division, Fourth Department,
2981. _ A.D.2d __, 607 N.Y.S.2d 518 (4th Dep't 1994).
2982. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This provision provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ....but upon probable cause.. . ." Id.
2983. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated ....but upon probable cause .... " Id.
2984. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993); People v.

Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 612 N.E.2d 298, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1993). Essentially,
the plain view doctrine, as described in both of these cases, permits the
warrantless seizure of objects viewed in plain sight when the incriminating
character of the object is immediately apparent and the authorities are lawfully
situated to both make the viewing and access the object. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct.
at 2136-37; Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612 N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
2985. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (holding that
government entrance upon open fields is not an unreasonable search even if the
owner has erected fences indicating an expectation of privacy). Cf. People v.
Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992). The New
York Court of Appeals expressly rejected the holding in Oliver to the extent
that the Oliver Court refused to distinguish between fields that the owner
sought to enclose and those that had no such enclosure. Id. at 478, 593 N.E.2d
at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922. In Scott, the court of appeals held that "where
landowners fence or post 'No Trespassing' signs on their private property or,
by some other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted, the
expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that they will be free
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held that the motion to suppress should have been granted
2986
because neither doctrine was applicable.
In Saurini, two deputy sheriffs entered the defendant's
neighbor's property with the neighbor's permission, and from
there viewed marijuana plants growing in defendant's
backyard. 2987 The deputy sheriffs then entered defendant's
property and seized 18 marijuana plants. 2988 The plants had been
growing in a flower bed behind the defendant's home at a
distance ranging from eight inches to three feet from the house
and were enclosed in a flower bed with a rope attached to the
house.

2 9 89

The New York Court of Appeals has stated that "[i]t is
fundamental that warrantless searches and seizures are per se
unreasonable unless they fall within one of the acknowledged
2990
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement."
The plain view doctrine is an exception that permits the
warrantless seizure of an object that is viewed in plain sight when
three conditions are met: 1)the person doing the viewing must be
lawfully positioned to view the object; 2) the person must
lawfully have access to the object; and 3) the incriminating nature
299 1
of the object must be immediately apparent.
In Saurini, although the deputies satisfied the first and last
requirements by being lawfully positioned to view the
immediately apparent incriminating nature of the plants, they did
2 9 92
not have lawful access to the plants when they seized them.
What the deputies needed was a lawful means of gaining entrance
from unwarranted intrusions is reasonable." Id. at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338,
583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
2986. Saurini, __ A.D.2d at
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
2987. Id. at
2988. Id. at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
, 607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
2989. Id. at

2990. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 109, 612 N.E.2d at 300, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943; see
also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures includes
conversations over public telephones).

2991. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37; Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612
N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
2992. Saurini,
A.D.2d at
_,
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to the defendant's property and the plain view doctrine
presupposes this factor, rather than supplying it. Though it has
been held that the plain view doctrine is an exception to the

warrant

requirement

for

seizures,

not

searches, 2 993

it

nevertheless requires that the person doing the seizing have prior
justification for being in a position from which he can seize the
object.2 994 In this case, the problem lay in the entering onto the
defendant's property to seize the evidence. Thus, the plain view
doctiine was inapplicable because the deputies did not have
2995
lawful access to the objects they seized.
The open fields doctrine asserts that "the government's

intrusion upon the open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable
searches' proscribed by the text of the Fourth Amendment."

2996

There are two significant aspects to this doctrine. First, where
does the curtilage end and the open field begin?2 997 Second, once
an area has been defined as an open field rather than part of the

curtilage, what constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of

the Fourth Amendment? 2 9 9 8 In Saurini, the court relied on the
2993. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 134 (1990) (stating that "[i]f
'plain view' justifies an exception from an otherwise applicable warrant
requirement... it must be an exception that is addressed to the concerns that
are implicated by seizures rather than by searches").
2994. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2136-37 (1993); People
v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110, 612 N.E.2d 298, 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d 940, 943
(1993).
2995. Saurini,

__

A.D.2d at

___,

607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.

2996. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
2997. See Florida v. Reilly, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (stating where greenhouse
located ten to twenty feet behind a mobile home was within the curtilage);
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that marijuana growing in
a fifteen by twenty-five foot plot in respondent's backyard was within the
curtilage); United States v. Depew, 8 F.3d 1424 (9th Cir. 1993) (where area
six feet from garage and fifty to sixty feet from the house was within the
curtilage); Wattenburg v. United States, 388 F.2d 853 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding
that stockpile of Christmas trees twenty to thirty-five feet from a lodge and
about five feet from a parking area of the lodge were within curtilage of the
lodge).
2998. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (holding government's intrusion upon the
open fields is not one of those 'unreasonable searches' proscribed by the text
of the Fourth Amendment). But see Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328,
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cases that have defined curtilage boundaries in finding the
marijuana in question was being grown within the curtilage
because of its proximity to the house and the rope enclosing
it. 299 9 However, even had they found that the marijuana was
growing outside the curtilage, it is likely that the court would

have held the warrantless entry onto defendant's property to be in
violation of his privacy rights as protected by the New York State
Constitution, pursuant to the second of the two open fields
doctrine aspects, in light of the Scott decision. 3 0o0
With regard to the second aspect, the United States Supreme

Court has held that "the term 'open fields' may include any
unoccupied or undeveloped area outside of the curtilage. An open
field need be neither 'open' nor a 'field' as those terms are used

in common speech." 300 1 Thus, the erection of a fence does not
necessarily defeat the open fields doctrine. 3002 New York State,
on the other hand, has expressly declined to adopt this position.
Rather, in People v. Scott, 30 0 3 the New York Court of Appeals
relied on the expectation of privacy test formulated in Katz v.
United States30 04 to hold that "where landowners fence or post
583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (where New York State Court of Appeals expressly held
that the expectation of privacy, if overtly manifested and reasonable by
objective societal standards, can defeat the open fields exception to the warrant
requirement with regard to searches and seizures).
2999. Saurini,
A.D.2d at
,607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
3000. Scott v. Keta, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1992). In deciding not to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Oliver v
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), the court of appeals stated:
We believe that under the law of this State the citizens are entitled to
more protection. A constitutional rule which permits State agents to
invade private lands for no reason at all - without permission and in
outright disregard of the owner's efforts to maintain privacy by fencing
or posting signs - is one that we cannot accept as adequately preserving
fundamental rights of New York citizens.
Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 486, 593 N.E.2d at 1335, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 927.
3001. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180 n.ll.
3002. Id. at 177.
3003. 79 N.Y.2d 474, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1992).
3004. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan
suggested that the expectation of privacy factor should be analyzed in two
steps: 1) whether the individual's manifestation of a subjective expectation of
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'No Trespassing' signs on their private property or, by some

other means, indicate unmistakably that entry is not permitted,
the expectation that their privacy rights will be respected and that
they will be free from unwanted intrusions is reasonable." 3005
Thus under New York State law, even property outside the
curtilage may be subject to the unreasonable search proscriptions
of article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution. 3006
In summary, neither the plain view doctrine nor the open fields
doctrine could justify the warrantless seizure of the defendant's

marijuana plants. The -plain view doctrine essentially augments an
existing justification, permitting the seizure of an object that is
not within the original justification if that object is viewed in
plain sight from a lawful vantage point, its incriminating nature is
immediately apparent, and the law enforcement official has some
other lawful basis for being in a position from which it can be
seized. 3007 The open fields doctrine defines an area of law in
which law enforcement officials may enter, without a warrant, an
area that is essentially outside the boundaries of the Fourth
Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 3008 While the state and federal case law differ as to

whether efforts indicative of an expectation of privacy impact the
identification of an open field, in this case, the plants were
privacy, and 2) whether such expectation would be viewed as objectively
reasonable by society. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The significance of
the expectation of privacy is that this case laid the foundation for viewing the
Fourth Amendment as essentially a protection of "people, not places." Id. at
351; see also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (stating that
"[t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a
'constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy'") (quoting Katz,
389 U.S. at 360).
3005. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d at 491, 593 N.E.2d at 1338, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
3006. Id. at 478, 593 N.E.2d at 1330, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 922 ("[W]e hold that
the Oliver ruling does not adequately protect fundamental constitutional
rights... and we decline to follow it.").

3007. See Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2136-37; Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d at 110, 612
N.E.2d at 301, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
3008. Hester, 265 U.S. at 59 ("[T]he special protection accorded by the
Fourth Amendment to the people in their 'persons, houses, papers, and
effects,' is not extended to the open fields.").
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reasonably within the curtilage 3009 and therefore not subject to
either jurisdiction's application of the open fields doctrine.
CRIMINAL COURT
BRONX COUNTY
10
People v. Moore 30

(printed September 24, 1993)
The defendants claimed that their New York State
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures 30 11 was violated when the police, after seizing and
frisking the defendants, searched the defendant's car with the aid
of a flashlight and seized a gun, despite the absence of probable
cause. 30 12 The court held that the police overstepped the bounds
of a reasonable search and violated the defendant's rights under
the New York State Constitution, article I, section 12.3013
Police Officer Robert Kissh was doing routine patrol in a high
crime area. 30 14 According to his testimony, at about 6:00 a.m.
he noticed the defendant's car double-parked in front of a
"known drug social club."3015 Officer Kissh observed the driver,
Mr. Moore, engage in a conversation with a known drug
dealer. 30 16 When Kissh and his partner approached the area, the
3009. Saurini,
A.D.2d at
607 N.Y.S.2d at 519.
3010. N.Y. L.J., Sept. 24, 1993, at 23 (Crim. Ct. Bronx County).
_,

3011. N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides in pertinent part:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Id.
3012.
3013.
3014.
3015.
3016.

Moore, N.Y. L.J., at 24.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
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